For most of my years as an elementary music teacher I both named myself, and allowed myself to be named, an Orff or Kodaly teacher. The intensive training I received in these methods, both over several summers and a year-long programme, ingrained in me narratives that constituted my words and actions, indeed, my thinking, in and out of the classroom. I look back on those years and realise that even now, as I continue to interrogate and challenge these methods, they will forever be a part of me. I recall those years and I am flooded with memories of 'my' students sitting in a semi-circle holding non-pitched instruments and Orff mallets in their hands. Memories of the step-by-step, from the 'known' to the 'unknown', of the articulated sequencing from body percussion to non-pitched instruments, practicing, presenting and building on the (seemingly always already) descending minor
 third and ta, ta, ti-ti, ta, fill (Marx, 1994: 107-8) 
framed a path of inquiry for examining what lay below the veneer and deceiving appearance of the 'rightness' and 'success' of the above-mentioned methods. This textual engagement with Marx also provided a mechanism for uncovering questions that I had never asked, but always seemed percolating at the surface. And lastly, this Marxist lens provided a way better to understand the power, fervency and seductive qualities that these music methods held not solely over me, but over many, many others. Thus, as I entered Marx with the desire to 'read through' his thoughts and ideas, I grappled with his texts in hopes that I would connect and find 'previously unrecognised relations and similarities between ideas'
. And finally, it was the way in which for me the method had so often taken on an aura of fetish as the students simply became tools in the process. Marx ' (1977: 184) (Butler, 1995: 8) (Marx, 1994: 53) . (Marx & Engels, 1978: 173) . Foucault suggests, that rather than to find a beginning point or origin, the task of history is to jolt us into recognising 'the basis of [the] beginnings, atavisms, and heredities' (1984b: 80 (Rousseau, 1956: 63) Pestalozzi, whose own writings were also influenced by those of Rousseau, articulated his 'laws of teaching' (Pestalozzi, 1894: 199) 
in such a way that one also is able to consider the direct correlation between his views and those of Orff and Kodaly. Among those laws:
• Arrange all objects in the world according to their likeness.
• (Hamblen, 1985: 2) . So while the intent may be to involve children in a process of musical engagement that is self-expressive and creative, the tools of these modes of production, including a particular 'folk language', can actually be used in such a way that alienates the students from a conception of musicking Orff and Kodaly envisioned. Thus, it is not just the musical presentation that almost always appears sophisticated, persuasive and winning that becomes a commodity, it is also the approach or method, as a mode of production, that ends up being exchanged as a commodity.
In the following section, I present a brief overview of some basic Marxist concepts that will serve to set up both the idea of methods as a mode of production and as a lens through which to consider the shift from the use-value of musicking, that both Orff and Kodaly desired, to that which functions as exchange-value commodity for both student and teacher.
U s e -V a l u e E x c h a n g e -V a l u e a n d (Marx, 1994: 107) History, for Marx and Engels, begins with the process of satisfying basic needs that arise in our existence as natural, social beings. Fulfilling these needs, which requires 'the action of satisfying and the acquisition of the instrument for this purpose' (Marx, 1994: 115-16 ' (1978: 172) Small (1998) (Marx, 1977: 130) Noddings (1992) 
, represent all forms of human activity (including art) and must not be viewed simply as the reproduction of human life, but rather as an expression of life, and thus, of who we are. Therefore, who humans are is 'dependent upon the material conditions that 'determine' the production' (p. 108), as well as dependent upon those who control those conditions. Consequently, what and who we are (and become) is thus intertwined with not only what and how we produce, but who controls the means of the production. Even for those who are not Marxist scholars or critical theorists, considering music as a commodity takes little effort. In fact, and unfortunately, the normalcy of this word distances us from attending to the human agency of this construct. However, even at the most rudimentary level, most people would agree that music can be, has been, and often is, exchanged for something other than personal enjoyment and pleasure. Atalli (1985) traces the path of music as a commodity and identifies the beginning point as the 19th century. 'Among sounds, music as an autonomous production is a recent invention. Even as late as the eighteenth century, it was effectively submerged within a larger totality . . .' (p. 3). However, music as a commodity can be traced back to the first organised sounds humans produced as something simply of use-value that would satisfy what Marx referred to as the human characteristics of social and creative expression. Elliott (1995) writes that musicking, as a 'strangely impractical endeavor' (p. 109), does not appear to satisfy a biological need: 'Homo sapiens is the species that 'musics'' (p. 109). And while music does not serve to satisfy hunger, thirst or provide shelter, the making of music can be viewed as subsistence, a 'thing' or process that satisfies social and creative needs.

would say is 'morally wrong and pedagogically disastrous' (p. 154). If, then, as Marx suggests, that what we are is what and how we produce, what of these methodological choices and how have they conditioned us as educators and as humans? In German Ideology (1994) Marx writes that 'Consciousness does not determine life, but life determines consciousness' (p. 112). For Marx, embedded within living life and freedom is an expected agency that indeed determines consciousness;
an agency that challenges and interrogates ideology that produces false consciousness, so that we might disrupt 'false conceptions of [ourselves] , about what [we] are or what [we] ought to be' (Marx, 1994: 103) . Agency, in many ways, means active disruption and constant interrogation of the choices (and non-choices) we make. It is to unmask the self-alienation that comes from the most base level of survival grounded on production.
H o w m e t h o d f u n c t i o n s
Does our teaching, our use of particular sets of practices and forms of discussion, subjugate? (Britzman, 1992: 257) Foucault (1980) , in writing of the 'how of power ' (p. 92) (Brenkert, 1979: 126) .
While Marx (1994) (Flagg, 1966: 30) Few would dispute that the contradictions of the world are such that it is both complex and disturbing. But is there also 'musical suffering?' Can this desire and need for method be considered an opium? Is method our 'sigh of the oppressed creature' and a manifestation of 'illusory happiness' (Marx, 1994: 28) Neither Orff nor Kodaly referred to their approaches as methods, and they certainly never referred to them as ideology. Yet, it is the 'production and representation' (Darder et al., 2003: 79) of meaning, and particular views and ritual practices, and the way in which they often function as 'apparatuses of control' (Foucault, 1980: 102) , as well as the common-sense element and irrefutable world view embedded in these methods (they 'work') that renders them ideology. The particular, predetermined end-point these methods serve and the power structures they mask, the assumption that literacy is an integral element of what it means to be a musician and for Kodaly thus, a 'better human being ' (Kodaly, 1967: 3) (Regelski, 2005: 16) .
S o m e l i n g e r i n g t h o u g h t s
Bowman (1998) cautions that the production of a commodity 'transforms relations between people into relations between things, and people's lives become increasingly defined by the exchangeability of the commodities they produce ' (p. 309) . These methods, and the music that is often produced in the systematic engagement with the method, estrange us from an educative process that celebrates creativity and intelligence and can lead us toward, in Marx's (1978) construction, 'deformity. . .idiocy, cretinism' (p. 73 
